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Political, Regulatory, and Legal Problems:
Focusing on the Securities Banking
Fence Issue, Insider Trading, and the
Disclosure Systems
By ICHIRO MATSUI*
I. THE FENCE BETWEEN THE SECURITIES AND
BANKING INDUSTRIES
In Japan, like in the United States, the securities business and bank-
ing operations have been separated from each other under article 65 of
the Securities and Exchange Law enacted in 1948.1 However, article 65
which prohibits banks from participating in securities businesses such as
underwriting corporate debentures, includes no explicit provision to for-
bid banks from becoming affiliated with securities companies. In the
United States, section 20 of the Glass Steagall Act expressly prohibits
affiliation of banks with securities companies.
The United Kingdom and Canada are trying to channel banking
capital, including foreign capital, into the securities industry in order to
strengthen the financial capabilities of securities firms and prevent the
domestic securities market from becoming "hollow." On the other hand,
arguments in favor of a greater role of banks in securities transactions to
ensure the profitability of banks are gaining momentum in the United
States. In response to these developments overseas, arguments for re-
* Professor, College of Law, Nihon University.
1. Article 65 provides:
No bank, trust company or other such financial institution as may be prescribed by
an Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance shall do as its business any of the acts set
forth in the items of paragraph 8 of article 2: Provided that this shall not apply to
cases where any bank buys or sells securities or affects securities index futures trad-
ing, securities options trading or foreign market's securities futures trading pursuant
to a written order received from a customer for the account of such customer or
where any bank, trust company or other such financial institutions as may be pre-
scribed by a Cabinet Order buys or sells securities or affects securities index futures
trading, securities option trading or foreign market securities futures trading for the
purpose of investment or pursuant to a trust agreement signed with its customers and
for the account of such customers in accordance with the provisions of other laws.
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moval of the long sustained fence between the secuities and banking in-
dustries are now being made in Japan as well.
Reviewing the Japanese financial system, the Committee on Finan-
cial Systems Research approved a subcommittee report on the proposed
removal of the fence between the securities and banking industries, at its
plenary session on July 13, 1990. The report recommends letting banks
and securities companies enter into each other's market through subsidi-
aries set up in each other's main sphere of business (sector-by-sector sub-
sidiary approach).
The expected benefits of banks' participation in the securities busi-
ness may include greater convenience for customers, greater stability for
bank management, and more efficient banking operations. At the same
time, there is a need to take preventive measures against the conflict of
interests and other conceivable ill effects which may result when banks
are allowed to concurrently lend money and deal in securities. Thus,
various restrictions on the relationship between a bank and its securities
subsidiary should be instituted. The restrictions should be designed to
prevent the conflicts of interest and malpractice that might otherwise
arise from concurrent banking and securities operations, protect inves-
tors and depositors, prevent banks from controlling other industries, and
ensure the soundness of banking operations. For example, a bank should
be prohibited from offering credit to, buying assets from, and providing
guarantees for the securities subsidiary. Banks should be prohibited
from taking any action regarding securities underwritten by the securities
subsidiary. Further, no person should be allowed to hold a senior posi-
tion in both a bank and its securities subsidiary. No senior level person-
nel should be interchanged between a bank and its securities subsidiary.
The disclosure of certain information should be made compulsory in or-
der to protect the interests of customers. Another issue deserving further
study is the implication of ownership of a controlling share in another
company by a bank in light of the antimonopoly law.
Even if the policy of allowing banks and securities companies to par-
ticipate in each other's businesses through their respective subsidiaries is
to be basically accepted, the Securities and Exchange Council2 considers
it necessary to leave article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law intact.
2. This council was established pursuant to article 165 of the Securities and Exchange
Act. Article 165 provides:
A Securities and Exchange Council shall be established within the Ministry of Fi-
nance for the purpose of studying and deliberating on material matters relating to the
issuance and trading of securities and other transactions and trading of securities
index futures, securities options and foreign market securities futures.
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This provision prohibits concurrent banking and securities operations by
the same organization. The council also considers it necessary for the
legislature to prohibit securities subsidiaries from engaging in securities
brokerage for the time being.
II. REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN
Japan's Securities and Exchange Law, enacted in 1948, was virtually
a verbatim translation of two U.S. laws-the Securities Act of 19333 and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.4 Article 1891 of the Japanese
law entitles a company to collect from any officers or major stockholders
any profits they may have obtained from the sale of shares in the com-
pany within six months from the date of their purchases. Article 586 of
the same law, like section 10(b) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act
and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, prohibits fraudulent malpractice in the sale or purchase of,
or any other deal in, securities.
In Japan, however, article 189 was seldom invoked, and article 58,
unlike its American counterpart, was generally considered hardly appli-
cable to insider trading. Accordingly, there was no judicial precedent of
invoking this provision against insider trading. As a consequence, in-
sider trading was regarded as not illegal and became a very common
practice in Japan.
However, as public pressure to make insider trading illegal built up
in the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada,
and as the securities market in Japan became internationalized, it was no
longer permissible for Japan to continue to be an "insider traders' para-
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781U (1988).
5. Article 189 of the Japanese law is similar to section 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
6. Article 58 provides:
No person shall perform any act set forth in the following items:
(1) To employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect to securi-
ties trading, other transactions, securities index trading, securities options trading or
foreign market's securities futures trading;,
(2) to acquire money or other property by using documents or by any represen-
tation which contains untrue statements of material matters or omit any material
facts necessary to make the statement therein not misleading with respect to securi-
ties trading, other transactions, securities index futures trading, securities options
trading or foreign market securities futures trading;, or
(3) to use false quotations for the purpose of inducing other persons to buy or
sell a security, affect other transactions, securities index futures trading, securities
options trading, or foreign market securities futures trading.
1991]
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dise." Finally, in 1988 Japan's Securities and Exchange Law was par-
tially amended to incorporate new provisions, which expressly prohibit
insider trading. The amendment took effect on April 1, 1989.
The new provisions prohibiting insider trading directly follow the
judicial precedents which developed in the United States with respect to
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 promul-
gated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Article 190-2 of the amended law provides that any officer or em-
ployee of a company which is the issuer of share certificates or the like
listed on the stock exchange, or any other person having a certain rela-
tionship to the company who becomes aware of any important fact con-
cerning the business of the company by virtue of his or her office, shall
not sell, buy, or otherwise deal in any listed share certificate or the like of
the company before the fact is made public. The article further provides
that any person having been informed of any such important fact con-
cerning the business or the like of the company by any party connected
to the company shall not purchase, sell, or otherwise deal in any listed
stock certificate or the like of the company before the fact is made public.
The article specifically defines what constitutes an important fact learned
in connection with the office in this context and the manner in which the
fact is made public.
Article 190-3 provides that any officer or employee of a party mak-
ing a tender offer or the like, or any other person having a certain rela-
tionship to the tender offerer, who becomes aware of any fact concerning
the execution or abandonment of the intended tender offer or the like by
the tender offerer or the like in connection with his or her office shall not
purchase, sell, or otherwise deal in any share certificate or the like which
is the object of the tender offer or the like before the fact is made public.
The article also prohibits any person who has learned of any fact regard-
ing the execution or abandonment of any tender offer from any party
connected to the tender offeror from purchasing, selling, or otherwise
dealing in any share certificate or similar item which is the object of the
tender offer before the fact is made public. This article specifically de-
fines what constitutes a fact concerning the execution or abandonment of
the intended tender offer or the like, and the manner in which the fact is
made public.
Anyone violating these provisions is subject to a prison term of not
more than six months or a fine of not more than 500,000 yen under item
4, article 200 of the amended law.
One of the characteristics of articles 190-2 and 190-3, discussed
above, is the objective and clear definition of what constitutes insider
[Vol, 14
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trading. If any officer or any person having a specified relationship to the
issuing company becomes aware of a specific fact, his or her dealing in
specific securities before the fact is made public will be subject to
punishment.
The key elements of insider trading, namely, what constitutes an
important fact and how that fact is made public, are objectively defined
by the law and by the Cabinet and Ministry orders promulgated thereun-
der. Once a person connected to the company becomes aware of an im-
portant fact under a specific circumstance, whether he or she makes use
of or bases his or her actions on the knowledge of the fact is irrelevant.
The important fact is deemed to have been made public if the issuing
company takes measures specified by the Cabinet order to make the fact
available to the knowledge of many persons, even if the fact is not actu-
ally known to many persons. The time at which the fact is made public
can thus be objectively determined.
Among the recipients of inside information, only the primary recipi-
ent or recipients are held liable with a view to preventing the liability
from extending indefinitely. The existence of any personal gain of the
insider in the transmission of inside information and any breach of fiduci-
ary duty to anyone are not required for an act to be deemed insider
trading.
There is no express provision concerning whether or not a public
investor, having suffered a loss owing to illegal insider trading, can bring
a private civil action for damages. This will be settled by judicial
precedents.
The first case of suspected violation of the prohibition on insider
trading in Japan was uncovered by the Metropolitan Police Department
in connection with the equity capital increase of Nisshin Kisen, a ship-
ping company whose stock is listed in the second section of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. Nisshin Kisen allocated new shares to third parties in
June 1989. A former president of a financing company was one of the
third parties to whom the new shares were allocated. He was alleged to
have taken advantage of inside information and bought Nisshin Kisen
shares in another person's name before the announcement of the capital
increase.7
This scandal involving Nisshin Kisen shares had been investigated
by the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Ministry of Finance, but both had
found no wrongdoing. Neither the Tokyo Stock Exchange nor the Min-
7. The violator was fined 200,000 yen by summary judgment in September 1990.
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istry of Finance is authorized to make compulsory investigations; thus,
their capability to detect violations is limited.
Japan had a Securities and Exchange Commission in the early post-
war period, but it was soon abolished as the administrative commission
system, which had been transplanted from the United States, did not suit
the Japanese bureaucratic soil. Even if it is unrealistic to expect the revi-
val of the Securities and Exchange Commission, an effective system to
control and monitor insider trading should be established by joint gov-
ernmental and private initiatives.
III. DISCLOSURE SYSTEMS UNDER THE
COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE LAW
A. Disclosure Under the Commercial Code
The Commercial Code, which includes corporate law, prescribes a
disclosure system for joint stock companies in general.
The Code requires that the notice of convening an ordinary general
meeting of shareholders be accompanied by financial statements (the bal-
ance sheet, income statement, business report, and proposals relating to
the disposition of profits or the losses), and the statutory auditor's audit-
ing report. If the company is valued at five hundred million yen or more,
or if the company's liabilities exceed twenty million yen, an auditing re-
port prepared by an independent certified accountant or incorporated ac-
counting firm is required. The Code further requires that the originals of
these financial statements be retained at the corporation's headquarters
for five years, and that copies be kept at branch offices for three years
from the day of the pertinent shareholders' meeting. Any shareholder or
creditor can demand access to or copying of any such document at any
time during the business hours of the company. The balance sheet, and
the income statement, if the company is large, should be published either
in whole or in summary in a newspaper designated by the articles of
incorporation.
Any company having one thousand or more voting shareholders is
required to attach prescribed reference documents to the notice of con-
vening a general meeting of the shareholders, and to send absentee bal-
lots to shareholders who will be absent at the meeting. The absent
shareholders can exercise their votes with these ballots. This absentee
voting system was introduced by the amendment of the Commercial
Code in 1979. It replaced the old system under which absentee share-
holders voted by proxy.
[Vol. 14
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Any shareholder holding shares constituting one-tenth or more of
the total outstanding shares is entitled to demand access to or copying of
all account books and documents.
B. Disclosure Under the Securities and Exchange Law
The disclosure system under the Japanese Securities and Exchange
Law, introduced in 1948, was modeled after that of the U.S. Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. It requires
two types of disclosure.
First, every time a company makes an offering of securities worth
five hundred million yen or more, the company is required to file a regis-
tration statement to the Minister of Finance and deliver a prospectus
directly to each investor.
Second, a company must make ongoing disclosures by filing reports,
including an annual report (securities report), a semiannual report, and
interim reports from time to time.
In 1979 a new system requiring a registration statement of tender
offers was established, followed in 1982 by the introduction of a system
of consolidated financial statements. In 1987 an integration formula was
instituted to permit the use of the annual report and the semiannual re-
port in the registration statement. Further, the items to be included in
various prescribed forms were reviewed. More detailed consolidated in-
formation was required with respect to financial information, and a funds
flow statement was introduced.
In 1988 a reference formula and a shelf registration formula were
introduced for use in the registration statement. The reasons for requir-
ing the presentation of an interim report were increased, and a system of
segment information disclosure was also introduced.
The segment information disclosure was new to Japan, but had al-
ready been established in the United States, the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, and Australia, to require companies to disclose profit and loss
information of their business activities with respect to each line of busi-
ness and" the locations of the parent company and subsidiaries. Interna-
tional accounting standards regarding the disclosure of segment
information had also been publicly announced in 1981.
More recently, in June 1990 a partial amendment of the Securities
and Exchange Law' introduced the five percent rule, which requires any
8. In this amendment, a new provision relating to the international cooperation between
securities regulating agencies was adopted. New article 184-2 provides that when a request for
cooperation in connection with an administrative investigation by a foreign securities regulat-
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purchasing bid in excess of five percent outside the securities market to
be made only by a tender offer, and requires any shareholder with a hold-
ing in excess of five percent to submit a large holding report to the Minis-
ter of Finance.
ing agency is received, the Minister of Finance may order any person concerned to submit
records and a report.
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